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  ISSN 0455-0420An Englishman once watched his first American football game. He looked intently as the team gath-
ered into a huddle after each play. His American host asked him what he thought of the proceedings.  
“Not a bad sport,” remarked the visitor, “but they do seem to engage in an excessive number of 
committee meetings.”  
Maybe what is true for American football is much more typical for the German economy nowadays, 
where trade unions and employers’ associations determine the wage rate and where round tables are 
used to find solutions to economic policy challenges.  
On the more serious side, I want to talk about some of the economic policy challenges that Ger-
many faces. Being an optimist by nature, I would paint a rosy picture, especially when abroad. As an 
academic, however, I have to paint a realistic picture. 
1   The Loss of Economic Dynamics 
After the unification boom of the early 1990s with GDP growth rates of 5.7 and 5.0 percent in 1990 
and 1991, respectively, Germany has had an extremely weak growth performance with a low growth 
rate of GDP of 1.6 percent per year in the period 1995–2001. This is roughly two percentage points 
lower than the rate of the United States. Since 1994, the German growth rate has been lower than the 
EU average in each year, and since 1998 Germany and Italy have alternated in being the tailender of 
the European Union in terms of growth. The forecasts for 2002 indicate the same story. To correct for 
population dynamics, for the slowing construction sector or to exclude strongly growing countries in 
Euroland that are catching up, like Ireland, Spain, and Portugal, does not change the story. The Ger-
man engine is stalling. German growth performance is definitely a problem relative to the experience 
of the other industrial countries.1 
Germany’s poor growth performance is partly linked to high unemployment, with 4 million offi-
cially unemployed and 1.7 million in labor market programs of various sorts (in 2002). After all, an 
important economic resource, labor and human capital, is being wasted. But Germany’s growth per-
formance also goes hand in hand with its loss of world market share in commodity exports since 1991, 
by 2.7 percentage points, from 11.4 to 8.7 percent in 2000 (Figure 1; Siebert 2002c); this is below the 
long-run average of 10.6 percent for the period 1975–1989. It can be argued that the convergence of 
developing countries implies a decline in the world market share of industrial nations. But, in contrast 
to Germany, the United States has succeeded in holding onto its world market share, and other coun-
tries have lost less. Moreover, Germany’s share in the industrial goods exports of all OECD countries 
is declining; this also holds relative to other industrial countries such as the United States, France, and 
the United Kingdom.  
Manufacturing, which accounts for 23 percent of employment, produces 89 percent of Germany’s 
exports. Four sectors of manufacturing account for 59 percent of total exports: machine building goods 
(18.9 percent), cars (17.7 percent), chemical products (12.2 percent), and electro-technical products 
(10.3 percent, data for 1999). Germany’s exports are overproportional with respect to commodity ex-
ports and correspondingly underproportional in services.2  
Machine building and car production still have a high comparative advantage3 (although German 
daughters of American car firms and the German mother of an American daughter are having some 
problems at the moment). But in the last two decades, the electro-technical industry, the production of 
_______________
1 Japan’s similar fate cannot be a consolation.  
2 For instance, the ratio of the share in world commodity exports to the share in commercial services for Germany is 1.63 
(1999) whereas the ratio is below one for other OECD countries except Japan (Langhammer 1999: Table 4).  
3 Measured in RCA coefficients.    4 
telecommunications instruments, and the optical industry have lost their comparative advantage. The 
pharmaceutical sector seems to be eroding as well, so that Germany can no longer claim to be the 
pharmacy of the world economy. BASF has sold its pharmaceutical branch to Abbot Laboratories; 
Hoechst has ended up in the new firm Aventis. The traditional chemical sector does not seem able to 
participate in the technological race for the pharmaceutical products of tomorrow. New innovative IT 
and biotechnological products have to be imported.  










































Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM, February 2002. 
Germany is heavily specialized on medium-technology (Figure 2), where the level of technology is 
defined in terms of R&D expenditure relative to the product price. Especially medium-sized firms of 
the “Mittelstand” have been successful with new sophisticated and human-capital-intensive medium 
technology in niches of the world market. By the same token, Germany exhibits a comparative disad-
vantage in high-tech products relative to the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. With re-
spect to the technology intensity of exports, Germany has a pattern of specialization which is similar 
Japan’s.  
Export prices of commercial products only increased by 0.8 percent per year in the 1990s (it was 
2 percent in the 1980s). Export unit values, the relation of prices of German commodity exports to 
world commodity exports (both in U.S. dollars) fell by 8 percent in the 1990s (IMF 2002). This indi-
cates narrow scope for setting high product prices and for shifting costs.  
West Germany’s manufacturing sector, which is nearly equivalent to the export sector, has lost 1.65 
million jobs since 1991 (in plants with 20 employees and more). This is a sizable loss relative to the 
5.7 million employees actually in that sector.4 
_______________
4 Another indicator for competitiveness is foreign direct investment. A country attracting foreign capital is competitive as a 
location. Except for the year 2000, when Vodafone acquired Mannesmann, there was a net outflow of foreign direct invest-
ment from Germany of €26,194 per year in the 1990s (1990–1999). With respect to foreign direct investment, greenfield 
investment, i.e., new plants, and ownership investment have to be distinguished (Klodt 2001). Whereas greenfield investment 
has a direct impact on the production potential of an economy, ownership investment brings in new management, different 
organization, and possibly a new technology which affects production potential only indirectly.    5
Figure 2: Competitiveness according to Technology Intensitya, 1999 
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aRCA coefficients according to technology intensity. – b1998. 
The three issues, low growth performance, high unemployment, and the loss of world market share 
are interrelated. Unemployment is a reason for low growth, and weak economic dynamics partly ex-
plain the high unemployment. The loss of competitiveness may be an underlying cause for both issues.  
Let us look at the reasons for poor growth performance.  
2   German Unification and the Fiscal Policy Stance 
German unification represented a major change in the economic conditions of Germany. In eastern 
Germany, it was a major change in the lives of people. The state-owned firms had to be privatized. 
Production had to be oriented towards the markets of the West. A new capital stock in the business 
sector, in infrastructure, and in housing had to be built up.  
The transformation of eastern Germany did not go as well as initially expected. Hopes that the 
German Wirtschaftswunder of the early 1950s could be replicated did not materialize. First, invest-
ment in eastern Germany was not a bottleneck problem, as in West Germany after 1945, when the re-
pair of a single bridge over the Rhine River represented a huge productivity boost. In eastern Ger-
many, the whole capital stock had to be redone. Second, exchanging the East German mark 1:1 to the 
West German Mark formed the wrong expectations, causing a devastating impact on wage negotia-
tions. Wages were quickly out of line with productivity, and unit labor costs were much higher than in 
western Germany. Third, German monetary union implied an appreciation of the East German mark 
by some 400 percent, an unprecedented price shock in postwar history and too much for any firm, es-
pecially those inefficient ones used to central planning.  
German unification required annual public transfers from the west to the east of 3–4 percent of 
German GDP in the 1990s, the overwhelming part not for investment but for consumption. Transfers 
were partly financed by new debt, leading to more than a doubling of government debt from 
€0.46 trillion in 1989 (or 42 percent of GDP) to €1.2 trillion in 2001 (60.5 percent of GDP).  
Eastern Germany, excluding Berlin, is now at 68.5 percent of western German GDP per capita 
(2000). It started out at 34.6 percent in 1991. In a policy-oriented approach it does not make sense to 
exclude Berlin from the eastern German region. If it is included, the eastern German region is now at 
72.6 percent of the western German level. Taking into account that some western German Länder such   6 
as Rheinland-Pfalz, Niedersachsen, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein reach 80–85 percent of the 
western German level, this is not a bad achievement.  
The manufacturing sector in eastern Germany has exhibited sizable growth rates in its net output, 
for instance, 7 percent in real terms in the period 1998–2000, albeit starting from a low level. In 
branches where new plants were built, as in car production, in the IT sector, in communications, and in 
areospace, high growth rates can be observed since 1991. In the construction of railroad cars, in ship 
building, and in leather and textiles, the rates have been negative (Ragnitz et al. 2001: Figure on p. 5). 
These are partly sectors with structural decline in western Germany as well. In machine building, the 
new activities could not offset the decline caused by transformation. 
Since 1997 the growth rate of real GDP in eastern Germany has been below the German rate. This 
means that the convergence process has reversed. This is partly due to a decline in the construction in-
dustry, as a correction to an over-expansion in that sector in the early 1990s due to public subsidies. 
It is quite apparent that German unification and the transfers in the magnitude of 3–4 percent of 
GDP have affected Germany’s fiscal policy stance negatively. The scope for tax reductions is severely 
reduced. Thus, even after the 2001 tax reform, the effective average tax rate for German corporations 
is still the highest in the EU.5 There was a real appreciation of the deutsche mark as a consequence of 
unification in the early 1990s, which affected Germany’s competitive position until 1995. It seems that 
western Germany is partly inhibited by financing the transfers, but it also seems that Germany cannot 
unfold enough economic dynamics for a strong carryover to eastern Germany.  
As an aside, examples of successful regional restructuring and successful, quick convergence pro-
cess are rare. Ireland is an example; Pittsburg may be another one. An important prerequisite for re-
gional growth is that initiative and an optimistic mood prevail. This definitely holds for the majority of 
people in eastern Germany, but the PDS, the party of democratic socialism, alludes to people’s feeling 
of being deprived and collects up to 20 percent of the votes.  
There is no doubt, that German unification has been—in economic terms—a shock to the German 
economy. But it would be misleading to assume that this is the only reason for Germany’s poor growth 
performance. German unification took place in an environment in which long-run trends were con-
tinuing on, leading to unresolved severe structural problems. Let us look at these issues in some detail. 
3   Unemployment 
Unemployment has ratcheted upward in the last thirty years in western Germany from 0.7 percent in 
1970 to 11 percent in 1997 (8.3 in 2001) (Figure 3). In each recession, roughly one million persons 
were added to the unemployed in western Germany, and the high unemployment was not reduced 
during the boom years in a noteworthy way, so that the next recession started from a higher level of 
unemployment. Unification added the structural unemployment problems in eastern Germany. 
The stepwise ratcheting upward of unemployment signals that the institutional design for labor is 
malfunctioning. Three major aspects should be considered in this respect: the first is the institutional 
design for wage formation, the second is the role of the reservation wage, and the third is the system-
atic weakening of the demand for labor.6 
_______________
5 This applies to the overall tax rate, but also to the tax rates on industrial buildings and machinery (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001: Table 41).  
6 As an aside, before I mention my critical points, the social partners have succeeded in introducing more time flexibility into 
the union contracts, thus exploiting an important source of productivity growth in the firms. This, incidently, has been ob-
tained in a decentralized way through agreements in the firms.   7
Figure 3: Unemployment Rate in Germany 
 





















aForecast of the Kiel Institute for World Economics. 
The institutional design for wage formation. Wage formation is not left to the markets but deter-
mined by the social partners. The approach is to start wage negotiations for a specific sector in a spe-
cific region, and then to apply the negotiated wages to the other regions of the same sector. Usually, 
the wage contract of one sector is mimicked in the other sectors of the economy. As a result, wage dif-
ferentiation is low relative to the United Kingdom and the United States, where the spread of wages 
has increased in the last twenty years. 
Trade unions have not accepted what the German Council of Economic Advisers has proposed as an 
orientation for wage policy: in a situation of high unemployment, wages should not be raised accord-
ing to the observed past trend in the growth of labor productivity but should remain below that trend in 
order to reduce unemployment. To put it differently, the expected increase in future labor productivity 
should not be calculated by dividing output by those employed but by also including the unemployed 
(4 million) and those in labor market schemes (1.7 million) in the numerator of the productivity meas-
ure.  
Let us look in more detail at some of the legal stipulations. Negotiated wages apply to all firms that 
are members of the employer’s association and to all workers who are members of the trade unions. 
De facto, firms do not differentiate wages according to union membership of workers or nonmember-
ship. Moreover, the unemployment offices mediate jobs for the unemployed according to the negoti-
ated wage (or the local customary wage). Thus, negotiated wages set the standard for the economy, 
even for the unemployed. Consequently, trade unions, which account for 19 percent of the active work 
force only and which are losing members, have a decisive influence on wages.  
The institutional setup for labor and the role of trade unions may be difficult to understand in a 
country like the United States, where wages are overwhelmingly determined by market forces. The   8 
clue to understanding the German setup is to know that the negotiated wage agreement is legally pro-
tected by a number of provisions. These stipulations prevent market forces from bringing about an 
equilibrium with less unemployment. They protect the insiders in their job, but they effectively dis-
criminate the outsiders, the unemployed. They define a wage cartel which gives trade unions and em-
ployers’ associations the right to set the wage, but they do not make them institutionally responsible 
for the quantities that will result in the labor market, i.e., employment and unemployment.  
One basic legal principle, the so-called Günstigkeitsprinzip (the principle of the favorable solution), 
stipulates that the individual worker can deviate from the negotiated union wage contract if this is fa-
vorable for him. “Favorable,” however, is interpreted in a narrow sense by the labor courts, namely as 
a higher wage than in the union contract or as less working time. The risk of becoming unemployed or 
the security of the job cannot legally be part of the consideration of whether to deviate from the union 
contract is favorable; this was explicitly decided by the highest labor court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) in 
1999. According to this decision, wages and working time on the one hand and the security of a job on 
the other hand are not allowed to be compared, whereas any freshman of economics knows that the 
three variables wage level, working time, and the security of a job are strongly interrelated. This im-
plies that efficient labor contracts are not feasible in the given institutional setting. To stipulate that the 
risk of losing a job should be taken into consideration or that the individual worker should have the 
right to decide for himself whether he wants to deviate from the union contract meets the strong oppo-
sition of the trade unions, who fear losing organizational power.  
Another legal provision stipulates that firms cannot deviate from the union contract unless this is 
permitted in the contract itself (§ 77,3 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz).7 Thus, even if the workers in a firm 
agree overwhelmingly to work longer hours per week or to accept a lower wage, this is verboten. 
Again, decentralized efficient labor contracts are not possible. Admittedly, firms and workers have 
disregarded this stipulation to some extent. But legal battles in the courts have sustained the law that 
prevents efficient labor contracts.  
The role of the reservation wage. A “social market economy” protects the individual when he is out 
of work, either because he is unemployed or because he is unable to work in case of illness or for other 
reasons. Germany has developed the following schemes: 
Unemployment benefits of type I (Arbeitslosengeld) amount to 67 percent of the previous net in-
come (unemployed with at least one child).8 The duration of benefits varies with age and lasts up to 32 
months.  
Unemployment benefits of type II (Arbeitslosenhilfe) amount to 57 percent of the net wage.9 It is 
paid when unemployment benefits of type I expire. This type of benefit is paid indefinitely. It is linked 
to the previous working income and requires neediness.  
Welfare benefits (Sozialhilfe) are payments to those who cannot work. They are intended to allow a 
life in dignity and are defined by minimum requirements for living. They are means-tested. Compared 
to a worker, married with one child, welfare benefits make up around 70 percent of the lowest net 
wage in industry and approach 100 percent for low-paid professions such as in the restaurant branch. 
Sickness pay amounts to 100 percent of the previous gross wage for the first six weeks and 80 per-
cent thereafter.10 
This set of government-provided incomes defines the reservation wage that an unemployed person 
requires from his next job; it influences search intensity and the willingness to accept a job. The higher 
the income provided by government when people are not working, the higher the reservation wage is. 
_______________
7 This provision even applies to firms which are not members of the employers’ association. 
8 60 percent for singles. Benefits are adjusted according to wage increases; they require a minimum time of contributions 
paid. 
9 With one child, 53 percent in other cases. 
10 It cannot surpass the net wage income. For the same illness, it is limited to 78 weeks in a three-year period.   9
Empirical analysis of the unemployed in Germany shows that the reservation wage amounts to 120 
percent of the wage when previously employed (Christensen 2002). This is unusually high for some-
one who wants to find a job, and it is high in comparison to other countries. The reservation wage is 
not reduced with the duration of unemployment. This means that search intensity and the willingness 
to accept a job are low. The labor market dries up from the supply side. The supply curve only starts at 
the reservation wage.  
At the same time, the described arrangements imply that neither workers nor their unions will ac-
cept a wage rate below the reservation wage. Thus, welfare benefits of the German type define a floor 
for the wage structure which prevents wage differentiation. There is an implicit minimum wage with-
out a minimum wage being formally defined. This means that the lower part of the demand curve for 
labor is effectively truncated. There is no effective labor demand below the minimum wage. Such an 
economy loses the lower segment of the labor market.  
Contributions to social security weaken the demand for labor. In addition to these institutional in-
centives, the demand for labor is systematically weakened for the following reason. The social security 
system is financed by contributions from labor income, paid by firms and by workers on a half and 
half basis. This implies a wedge between the gross and the net wage. The gross wage must be sup-
ported by labor productivity. If not, the contributions to the social security system have a similar effect 
as a tax on labor, weakening the demand for labor. Firms attempt to bring the gross wage in line with 
productivity. They can do this through various adjustments: lay off workers so that those employed 
have a high enough productivity to cover the net wage and the social wage, substitute capital for labor, 
look for labor-saving new technologies, and shift production abroad. When all these adjustments have 
taken place in a general equilibrium, unemployment results. Thus, the worker bears the burden of ad-
justment. Whereas the reservation wage affects the labor supply and the wage rate in the lower seg-
ment of the labor market, mandatory contributions to the social security system increase the costs of 
firms, which shifts the complete labor demand curve of the economy downward.  
Lay-off constraints. Another aspect is that lay-off restraints and the practice to get around them with 
high severance pay represent an exit constraint that is anticipated by the firms; it also weakens the de-
mand for labor. This exit constraint for those who are employed represents an entry barrier for the un-
employed. The restraint is especially binding when in times of a crisis wages and working time are 
sticky downward for the individual firm.11  
To sum up, looking at this institutional arrangement, it seems that Germans cannot imagine that 
wages can be determined by the market, as is the case in other countries.  
4   The Social Security Systems under Strain 
Germany is characterized by a generous social system which consists of the old-age pension system, 
old-age care, health insurance, unemployment insurance with two types of unemployment benefits, 
and social welfare. One-third of GDP is spent for the “social budget” (Siebert 2001a). Whereas part of 
the social budget is financed from tax revenue, the bulk of the expenditures is financed by contribu-
tions paid half and half by workers and employers. The financing of the system is thus linked to the 
labor contract. 
There was a major expansion of the welfare state in the 1970s. The share of government in GDP 
rose from 39 percent in 1969 to 50 percent in 1980 (Figure 4). It was somewhat reduced in the 1980s 
_______________
11 Downward flexibility in working time with a reduction of pay can reduce the impact of lay-off constraints.   10
and went up to 50 percent in the 1990s, and now stands at 48.4 (in 2000). 12 The share of the contribu-
tions to the social security system has risen from 12.6 percent to 18.9 percent (1999). The expansion 
took place when the high real GDP growth rates of the 1950s and the 1960s of 7 and 5 percent could 
no longer be obtained.  
Figure 4: Government Share in GDPa 
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aIn current prices; until 1990: West Germany. 
Source:  German Council of Economic Advisers, Annual Report 1998/99, Table 33*, and Annual Report 
1999/2000, Table 27*; own calculations. 
The marginal tax and contribution rate on income from labor is high: it amounts to 60 percent for 
the average earner (single earner, married, two children). Such high marginal rates represent wrong in-
centives for the work force to work and accumulate human capital. The negative impact on human 
capital accumulation is especially relevant in an information society, where human knowledge is the 
dominant source of economic growth. The existing arrangement thus hurts the growth dynamics and it 
may well be a reason for the loss of dynamics. Besides, it is an invitation to move to the underground 
economy or to officially take residence in low-tax places such as London, which is relevant for the 
modern services sectors (banking). In any case, here is a line of attack for economic policy that wants 
to overcome obstacles to economic growth. The impact of the contribution rates on the demand for la-
bor and on the supply of labor via the reservation wage have already been discussed.  
Government share and growth. It can be expected that the relationship between the share of gov-
ernment in GDP and economic growth follows an inverted U-shaped curve. An extremely low share of 
government in GDP can be expected to be associated with deficiencies in the legal framework of the 
market, i.e., high transaction costs due to uncertainty of contracts, a low level of internal security, and 
insufficient physical infrastructure. This has a negative effect on the productivity of the private sector 
that outweighs the negative impact of taxes. With an increase in the size of government, this overall 
negative effect can be expected to decline. If a certain size of the government is surpassed, the nega-
tive effect on work effort and on entrepreneurial effort begins to dominate. Apparently, government 
activity not only includes the allocation branch, which provides public goods and finances them 
through taxes, but also distributional targets, including the social security system. The task is to find 
the optimal size of governmental activity. Econometric studies suggest that in countries with an in-
_______________
12 This development has been similar in other European countries, whereby some countries have reached much higher 
shares. The United States and Japan have a share below 40 percent (Heitger 2001). 
60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000  11
tense involvement of government in the economy, a reduction in the government share will increase 
the growth rate (Heitger 2001).13  
Controlling the increase in expenditures. So far, administrative attempts to control the cost increase 
of the social security system, for instance, in health care, have failed. Using such measures, the cost 
increase was halted for a year or two, but afterwards the increase resumed. It can be expected that ad-
ministrative measures cannot control the cost increases. A solution would consist in distinguishing 
large and small risks for the individual. Large risks are those that cannot be borne by the individual, an 
example being a longer illness or disability. These risks have to be taken over by society; they require 
mandatory contributions. Small risks, like having no income in the first days of unemployment or ill-
ness, however, can be borne by nearly all members of society,14 for instance, by precautionary sav-
ings; they may also be covered by voluntary insurance. In my judgment, this distinction must be at the 
heart of reforming the welfare state. It must be applied to all areas of social security. Redistribution 
that is now part of the different branches of social security has to be shifted to the tax-transfer mecha-
nism (Sachverständigenrat 1996); more equivalence has to be sought in the social security systems. By 
distinguishing between large and small risks, the mandatory contributions to the welfare system can be 
reduced. The negative impact on the demand for labor and the supply of labor can be meliorated.  
Other aspects of the large share of government in GDP (incidently, with a low and declining share 
of public investment in GDP) is to rethink the role of government in the market economy. Here Ger-
many has been slow to privatize public firms such as telecommunications and the postal service in the 
past, and it would have been even slower without pressure from the European Union. 
Finally, subsidies are a case in point. According to a survey of the Kiel Institute (Boss and 
Rosenschon 2000) using a wide delineation, subsidies account for €150 billion per year, that is, 8 per-
cent of GDP, or 36 percent of total tax revenues.  
The political economy of an aging society. All these issues become more relevant in aging society. 
Germany will be severely affected by the aging of its population, more so than France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The average age (median of the population) will increase from 39.8 
years (1999) to 48.6 years in 2050, assuming an annual net immigration of 200,000 persons. This will 
have severe repercussions for growth (labor supply will shrink), for the capital stock, the welfare state, 
and the political economy (Siebert 2001b).  
5   The Regulation of Product and Capital Markets 
Product market regulations play a role in generating or inhibiting economic dynamics. As already 
mentioned, Germany has been rather slow and late in deregulating and privatizing the telephone ser-
vice. The regulation of biotechnology is another case in point. The licensing of new products and pro-
duction procedures in specific areas like biotechnology and the granting of building permits, including 
investment projects are other examples.15 The regulations on the crafts may impede additional ser-
vices and employment. Moreover, the rules specifying store closing hours, together with labor market 
regulations, partly explain why the service sector is underdeveloped in Germany. Finally, an indicator 
of product market regulations is that according to the Index of Governmentally Administered Con-
_______________
13 See also Lindbeck et al. 1994. 
14 Those that cannot afford to save would be taken care of by governmental support, for instance, by social welfare.  
15 Explicitly moving out of atomic energy is likely to have two negative implications in the future. First, it will put oil 
producers in an improved strategic position when world oil annual supplies are reduced according to a Hotelling scenario; oil 
producers will then have a higher threat potential because a credible backstop technology is lacking in the industrial 
countries. Second, it will make it more difficult to solve the CO2 problem.   12
sumer Prices, calculated by the German Council of Economic Advisers, 34 percent of consumer prices 
are directly or indirectly administered. 16 
Another issue is the form of corporate governance and the role of the capital market. So far, banks, 
rather than the equity market, have dominated in the control of the boards of firms. This control has 
been a passive form in the sense that the bank representative intervenes to prevent unfavorable devel-
opments but lets the management do its business otherwise.17 This form of corporate governance may 
allow a necessary longer-run orientation of firms and it may therefore have its advantages. However, it 
is geared to the incumbent firms and not to the uncertain terrain of new firms. It is amazing that Ger-
many has, in solving its structural adjustment problems, put emphasis on the existing firms, but not on 
new firms. The new firms are disadvantaged by the given institutional arrangements.18 Indeed, there 
are only a very few examples of new firms that have grown into large entities. The German approach 
to corporate governance may have been good in marginal improvements, for instance, in applying new 
production techniques to given goods, but it is deficient in leapfrogging to new approaches and com-
pletely new products.19 The German system of corporate governance through banks is now starting to 
experience the impact of globalization. Banks are coming under the increased international pressure of 
intensified competition, limiting their possibilities to provide credits to firms in trouble for national or 
political reasons. Banks are becoming weaker in defending the “Deutschland-AG.” Thus, more com-
petition between banks indirectly has a similar effect as an equity market would have. 
With respect to human capital, the institutional arrangement of the apprenticeship system is an as-
set. It combines learning on the job with formal education. It also is an important mechanism of so-
cialization of young people into society and of integrating them into the labor market. In contrast, the 
institutional arrangements for the university system and for large-scale research institutes are deficient. 
The university system is steered with governmental planning measures such as capacity regulations as 
to the student load that universities have to take in and other bureaucratic procedures. In areas where 
capacity is lower than the number of students, a central governmental agency allocates the scarce slots 
to the students. As in the labor market, Germans like to believe in “Behörden,” in governmental agen-
cies. It appears to be beyond the imagination of public opinion in Germany and of many politicians 
that competition can and must be the relevant approach to organizing the university system. Many 
Germans have no confidence in competition and in the market process. However, the most important 
ingredient of an approach with which to achieve a higher growth path is to revamp the German univer-
sity system and organize it according along the lines of competition. So far, equity considerations hin-
der politics in following this alternative.20 Here a sea change in the orientation of politics is necessary. 
_______________
16 Sachverständigenrat (2001/02: Table C1).  
17 The insolvency of Holzmann and Kirch are examples where this type of control has not functioned.  
18 This also holds for the tax reform, pursuant to which retained earnings receive preferential treatment.  
19 The venture capital market has improved.  
20 A central argument against opening the university system to competition is the fear that the equity goal will be violated in 
that children of workers will then find it harder to enter universities. Of course, such an effect has to be prevented using an 
open system of entry that does not favor income or inheritance and that, for instance, provides stipends for talented people 
based on a means-blind admission policy. But it is simply wrong to assume that the actual system without fees is equitable. 
With respect to taxation, workers contribute a much larger share to financing universities than the share of workers’ children 
in universities (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Jahresgutachten 1998/99: 
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6   The Consensus Approach 
The social market economy. The original concept of “the social market economy” in the Erhard inter-
pretation attempted to reconcile efficiency and equity. An underlying idea is that the benefits of eco-
nomic progress should be widely distributed and go to all or at least to the wide majority of people and 
that necessary economic adjustments should be eased by social considerations and the appropriate in-
stitutional safeguards.  
The concept has been relevant for all areas of economic policy, wherever equity ideas are involved. 
This holds for product market regulation which protects existing jobs (for instance, in the traditional 
postal service, including telecommunications) even if new jobs are prohibited (in new areas of tele-
communications). The concept also holds for the labor market institutions, where insiders are pro-
tected, but where by the same protection market access for the outsiders is restricted. It holds for the 
social welfare system, for taxation policy, and even for not allowing competition as a basic element of 
organizing the university system. It also has been used to justify subsides; they cover up some of the 
adjustment problems. The issue for Germany today is to what extent the application of this concept of 
“social market economy” has meanwhile had a negative impact on economic dynamics in the long run, 
so that the economic basis for social programs becomes weaker and weaker. 
The consensus approach. An important aspect of the German system related to the social market 
economy is a consensus approach in which the explicit or implicit agreement of many groups of soci-
ety is sought when important policy measures are taken. This is typical for the round tables and com-
mittees used by Chancellor Schroeder, such as the “Alliance for Work,” but it is also typical for the 
two layers of decision-making in the firms, that is, codetermination in the boards of larger firms as 
well as the workers’ councils in the firms. Finally, the consensus approach is dominant in both major 
parties. It even holds in the election year 2002, where the opposition hesitates to point out the changes 
necessary for Germany.  
The consensus approach may sound rather humane, at first glance, but it has serious shortcomings. 
With respect to organized groups, a constitutional question is to what extent the parliament loses 
power to organized interest groups. Another question is that the status quo plays an important role in 
the consensus approach. Major changes are not accepted when important groups in society are nega-
tively affected by such changes. In a way, the consensus approach is an application of the Pareto crite-
rion used by economists, according to which an increase in welfare presupposes that at least one wins 
and no one loses, with the difference that in politics a relative loss is considered a loss as well. This 
implies that a standstill is often the outcome, that economic dynamics disappear.21 Decisions tend to 
be blocked if you look for consensus and distribution only.22,23  
_______________
21 See “D-Land, einig Stillstandland,” Die Zeit, January 24, 2002. 
22 The present government has introduced three major laws that go in the direction of modernization: the tax reform, the 
limited switch to partial private funding of old-age insurance, and the immigration law. Some tiny reforms of the previous 
government have been undone, for instance, in health insurance and the lay-off law as well as other areas. The labor market 
has been re-regulated by a set of new laws. Industrial relations (co-determination) have also been additionally regulated, 
which has not been well received by the smaller and medium-sized firms of the German Mittelstand. The welfare state has 
not been modernized, especially with respect to health insurance. Burden-sharing between the federal states has not been 
changed in the sense of a competitive federalism. After the tax reform, Germany’s business taxes are still high relative to 
other EU countries. The tax reform favors existing firms and physical capital (not human capital). The pension reform may 
prove not to be viable in the long run. It is open to what extent the new immigration law will be implemented in the form of 
an explicit immigration policy where the (economic) interest of the immigration country dominates in choosing those who 
immigrate.  
23 This will be a major issue for a constitution-like arrangement for the European Union. If equity and distribution dominate, 
a blockage is the likely outcome (Siebert 2002a).   14
An important shortcoming is that such an approach does not make use of the decentralized institu-
tional change24 in which new developments occur more or less automatically and where new ways to 
do things, i.e., institutions, can be found spontaneously in a Hayekian sense to adjust to the new eco-
nomic conditions. Round tables do not have an automatic and decentralized way to find new institu-
tional solutions. They are concerned with formally establishing and adjusting the rules. Such a system 
does not make use of the problem-solving capacity of decentralized and spontaneous change.  
Short-termism and adhocery. An issue related to the consensus approach is interventionism where 
the politician solves acute economic problems in a “fire-brigade” approach on an ad hoc basis. In an 
environment where the interest groups have an important say, they tend to expect the government to 
solve specific and unusual economic problems by means of a tailored intervention. This can be ex-
pected to lead to adhocery, to a short-run orientation, and to inconsistency in economic policy. “In the 
long run, there is just another short run,” as Abba Lerner once said. More fundamental restraints are 
likely to be put on the back burner, for instance, long-run impacts of economic policy measures, issues 
of sustainability, and intergenerational budget constraints. In such an approach, the politician does not 
lead. As Churchill answered when asked what makes the difference between a politician and a states-
man: “A politician always thinks of the next election, a statesman considers the next generation.” 
Distributive federalism. German federalism also shows strong elements of equity and consensus, for 
instance, by requiring similar conditions with respect to public infrastructure in the regions of the 
country. This is often interpreted as similar living conditions in each of the federal states. German fed-
eralism is not a competitive federalism where states compete for the mobile factors of production, 
capital, technology, and highly qualified labor, and where locational competition points out the best 
solutions. It is a distributional federalism where the tax revenue of each federal state is brought to 
nearly 100 percent of the average in a transfer-scheme between the states (and the federal level). Bur-
den-sharing between the states, a key concept, does not set the right incentives for states to develop 
their own tax base and business base.  
Consensus under conditions of expansion. The consensus approach probably did not do too much 
harm in an environment of high growth rates of 7 percent, as in the 1950s, and 5 percent, in the 1960s, 
when the German economy was catching up to the Unites States and when welfare gains could be 
spread widely. In a situation when the annual growth rate is around 1½ percent, restraints become 
more binding and goal conflicts more biting. This raises the question whether the institutional setup 
for decision-making is part of the German problem of low growth performance. In that sense, Ger-
many may face a similar problem as Japan, whose institutional system was appropriate for an ex-
panding economy, but no longer seems appropriate to solving structural issues.25 
Other institutional arrangements are relevant as well in this context. For instance, with respect to the 
workers’ councils the question can be raised as to what extent this decision process is appropriate for 
an economy that marginally improves the existing production technology and modernizes established 
products. But such an approach may be inappropriate in an environment where a new technology has 
to be applied and where new products have to be developed.26  
I am concerned by the question to what extent a country like Germany becomes immobile with re-
spect to institutional modernization. Is this the fate of a mature economy that can no longer solve the 
major economic policy issues? Have structures become so rigid that institutional adjustment can no 
longer take place. Has the political process lost its problem-solving capacity? And must it rely more 
and more on decisions of the Constitutional Court to resolve deadlocks? Can Germany be compared to 
_______________
24 Competition and markets are a method of decentralized change. If the market is restricted by many rules that specify what 
cannot be done, decentralized change is prohibited.  
25 The relative overrepresentation of agricultural voting districts to the city districts of Japan finds its analogon in the 
consensus approach in Germany. 
26 On the necessary changes, see Siebert (2001a and 2001c).   15
Japan as another mature economy? Are these two countries the newly declining countries of the world 
economy?  
These questions are especially relevant in a situation where other countries have undertaken major 
changes in their institutional arrangement. This holds for the Netherlands since 1982, for Ireland, for 
the United Kingdom, and even for the United States in the 1980s. In such an environment, the relative 
position of a country remaining immobile institutionally is negatively affected.  
7   Conclusion: Germany as an International Player 
The picture of Germany that I have painted may help you to understand Germany’s role in the interna-
tional community. Germany has been a driving force in the political integration of the European Union 
in the last fifty years, including monetary union. Policy instruments have been shifted to the EU level, 
for instance, in trade policy, competition policy, but also in product market and capital market regula-
tion and environmental policy. In the current EU constitutional debate, Germany seems to be more 
prepared than other countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, to give up national sovereignty 
to a European Parliament. Of course, the new economic conditions mean that Germany can no longer 
foot the European bill if EU compromises have to be paid for using German cash.  
Internationally, Germany is prepared to play its role in international organizations such as the WTO 
and in pushing forward global environmental treaties. 
The need for a renaissance of the market economy. My portrait of a Germany with a loss of eco-
nomic dynamics, high unemployment, and an over-extended welfare state does not mean that existing 
German firms are not efficient. They are, but they have maintained their competitiveness by shedding 
labor, by creating jobs abroad. In addition, they seem to prove their competitiveness more abroad than 
at home. What is needed are more new firms and more firms in new areas. Note that firms may be 
competitive whereas a location, “Standort Deutschland,” may not.  
Whereas the existing firms are efficient, the institutional frame of reference defined by the political 
system seems wanting. It is not sufficiently geared towards innovation and modernization. Maybe the 
optimistic answer is that the Germans as a people are resilient, that in terms of economics they are 
good when they have their backs against the wall and that they are not yet in that position. To bring 




To conclude, Germany is facing quite a few severe economic policy challenges. In my heart I am an 
optimist, and of course I hope that Germany will find solutions for all its problems. To close with an 
optimistic tone, maybe a country should keep in mind what Calvin Coolidge once said: “If you see ten 
troubles coming down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into the ditch before they reach 
you.”  
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